Bug 1625664

+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1625095 +++

+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1625085 +++


This is an automatically created tracking bug!  It was created to ensure
that one or more security vulnerabilities are fixed in affected versions
of fedora-all.

For comments that are specific to the vulnerability please use bugs filed
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Please also mention the CVE IDs being fixed in the RPM changelog and the
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NOTE: this issue affects multiple supported versions of Fedora. While only
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--- Additional comment from Siddharth Sharma on 2018-09-04 01:44:38 EDT ---

Use the following template to for the 'fedpkg update' request to submit an
update for this issue as it contains the top-level parent bug(s) as well as
this tracking bug.  This will ensure that all associated bugs get updated
when new packages are pushed to stable.

=====

# bugfix, security, enhancement, newpackage (required)
type=security

# testing, stable
request=testing

# Bug numbers: 1234,9876
bugs=1612664,1625085

# Description of your update
notes=Security fix for [PUT CVEs HERE]

# Enable request automation based on the stable/unstable karma thresholds
autokarma=True
stable_karma=3
unstable_karma=-3

# Automatically close bugs when this marked as stable
close_bugs=True

# Suggest that users restart after update
suggest_reboot=False

======

Additionally, you may opt to use the bodhi web interface to submit updates:

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--- Additional comment from Worker Ant on 2018-09-04 02:18:37 EDT ---

REVIEW: https://review.gluster.org/21068 (server-protocol: don't allow '../' path in 'name') posted (#1) for review on master by Amar Tumballi

--- Additional comment from Worker Ant on 2018-09-05 05:24:13 EDT ---

COMMIT: https://review.gluster.org/21068 committed in master by "Amar Tumballi" <amarts> with a commit message- server-protocol: don't allow '../' path in 'name'

This will prevent any arbitrary file creation through glusterfs
by modifying the client bits.

Also check for the similar flaw inside posix too, so we prevent any
changes in layers in-between.

Fixes: bz#1625095

Signed-off-by: Amar Tumballi <amarts>
Change-Id: Id9fe0ef6e86459e8ed85ab947d977f058c5ae06e